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Anti-Social Behaviour, Expulsion from
Condominium, and the Reconstruction
of Ownership
DOUGLAS C. HARRIS*
Statutory condominium regimes facilitate massive increases in the density of owners. The
courts are responding to this spatial reorganization of ownership by reconstructing what it
means to be the owner of an interest in land. This article analyzes the ten cases over eight
years (from 2008 to 2015) in which Canadian courts grant eviction and sale orders against
owners within condominium for anti-social behaviour. The expulsion orders are new. Until
these cases, ownership within condominium in Canadian common law jurisdictions was
thought to be as robust as ownership outside condominium such that owners could not
be expelled from condominium for anti-social behaviour. In addition to describing a new
development in Canadian property law, the analysis reveals that some form of mental disorder
appears to be a contributing factor in the majority of the cases. The article then argues
that eviction and sale orders are not only reconstructing ownership, but also redistributing
property. This is because the orders, although diminishing the security of property for
some, enhance ownership for a great many more by providing a remedy—the physical and
legal expulsion of an owner for chronic anti-social behaviour—that is not available to those
outside condominium. Finally, the article argues that the judicial willingness to reconstruct
ownership is a function, at least in part, of the spatial reorganization of owners. What it

*	Associate Professor and Nathan T. Nemetz Chair in Legal History, The University of British
Columbia, Peter A. Allard School of Law. I wrote the first draft of this article while a visiting
fellow at New College, Oxford, and first presented it at “The Precarious Home: Socio-legal
Perspectives on the Home in Insecure Times” workshop, Oñati International Institute for
the Sociology of Law, 26 June 2015. I thank the convenors of that workshop, Helen Carr,
Brendan Edgeworth, and Caroline Hunter, for their encouragement; Oren Adamson, Joel
Bakan, Emma Cunliffe, Bob Driscoll, Cole Harris, Shi-Ling Hsu, Michael Johnson, Graham
Reynolds, Michel Vols, Margot Young, Kevin Zakreski, and two anonymous reviewers for
comments on drafts; reference librarian Elim Wong in the UBC Law Library for tracking
down sources; and Kaitlin Green for research assistance.
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means to be an owner of land emerged from a context where owners were dispersed over
the surface of the earth. Under statutory condominium regimes, owners can now be stacked
in a vertical column many stories high. The article concludes by asking whether the judicial
reconstruction of ownership is an appropriate response to the spatial reorganization of
owners and the resulting challenges posed by anti-social behaviour when the behaviour is
frequently attributable, at least in part, to some form of mental disorder.
Le régime législatif de la copropriété facilite une augmentation massive de la densité des
propriétaires. Les tribunaux réagissent à cette réorganisation spatiale de la propriété en
reformulant la signification du fait de posséder un intérêt foncier. Cet article analyse, sur
une période de huit ans (de 2008 à 2015), les dix cas où les tribunaux canadiens ont ordonné
l’éviction de copropriétaires et la vente de leurs biens en raison de comportements antisociaux.
Ces ordonnances d’éviction sont nouvelles car, jusque là, sous le régime de la common law
du Canada, le statut de copropriétaire était réputé aussi robuste que celui de propriétaire,
de sorte qu’un copropriétaire ne pouvait pas être expulsé en raison de comportements
antisociaux. En plus de décrire une évolution du droit canadien en matière de propriété, cette
analyse révèle qu’une certaine forme de désordre mental semble être un facteur contributif
dans la majorité de ces cas. L’article fait de plus valoir que les ordonnances d’éviction et
de vente ne font pas que reformuler le droit de propriété, mais redistribuent également la
propriété. C’est parce que ces ordonnances, même si elles réduisent pour certains la sécurité
du droit de propriété, améliorent le droit de propriété de beaucoup d’autres en apportant un
recours—l’éviction physique et juridique d’un copropriétaire pour comportement antisocial
chronique—qui n’est pas accessible en dehors de la copropriété. Finalement, l’article fait
valoir que l’accord des tribunaux pour reformuler le droit de propriété est sous-tendu, du
moins en partie, par la réorganisation spatiale des propriétaires. Le statut de propriétaire
foncier date d’une époque où les propriétaires étaient dispersés à la surface de la terre.
Sous le régime législatif de la copropriété, les propriétaires peuvent désormais s’empiler
sur plusieurs étages de hauteur. L’article se termine en s’interrogeant sur l’adéquation de
la reformulation judiciaire du droit de propriété en réponse à la réorganisation spatiale des
propriétaires et aux problèmes qui en découlent, résultant de comportements antisociaux,
lorsque ces comportements sont fréquemment attribuables, du moins en partie, à une
certaine forme de désordre mental.
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I. PERFECT STORMS
In 2010, a Toronto condominium corporation applied to Ontario’s Superior
Court for an order to expel Natalia Korolekh. Her neighbours alleged that she
was physically assaulting, verbally abusing and threatening them, damaging their
property, peering into their homes, playing loud music at night, and using her
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large and aggressive dog to frighten and intimidate. Accepting the evidence,
including that of behaviour amounting to criminal acts of assault and mischief
and a continuing refusal to adhere to condominium by-laws, Justice Michael
Code ordered Ms. Korolekh to vacate and sell her townhouse. “This case,” he
wrote, “is a ‘perfect storm’ where the misconduct is serious and persistent, where
its impact on a small community has been exceptional and where the Respondent
appears to be incorrigible or unmanageable.”1
A “perfect storm” describes a rare combination of circumstances that
produces “the worst possible or an especially critical state of affairs.”2 By using
this metaphor, Justice Code was indicating that eviction and sale orders against
owners within condominium were a last resort, reserved for the most egregious
and destructive behaviour, where no other order would suffice. In granting the
order, he cited an earlier decision that denied a similar application, but which
noted two unreported eviction and sale orders from the 1990s, and Justice Code
indicated that he was aware of others.3 Nonetheless, the “draconian” and “extreme”
order to expel an owner from condominium was without clear precedent and
certainly not common.4 Several decades earlier, when Dennis Pavlich authored
an early text on condominium law, ownership within condominium was thought
to be as robust as that outside it, such that an owner could “never be evicted”
for problematic behaviour.5 This has changed. In fact, Korolekh appears to have
reflected and precipitated a change in climate such that perfect storms (or the
judicial willingness to detect them) have become almost commonplace.
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corp No 747 v Korolekh, 2010 ONSC 4448 at para 87,
322 DLR (4th) 443 [Korolekh].
The Oxford English Dictionary, 3d ed, sub verbo “perfect storm.”
York Condominium Corp No 136 v Roth, [2006] OJ No 3417 at para 20, 150 ACWS (3d)
951 (Ont Sup Ct J) [Roth]. See also Korolekh, supra note 1 at paras 81-85.
Ibid at paras 8, 20. In 2003, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench made an eviction order,
but not an order for sale. See Owners: Condominium Plan No 022 1347 v NY, 2003
ABQB 790, 351 AR 76. See also the British Columbia Supreme Court’s eviction order in
Strata Plan NW 1080 v Verlaan, cited in Paul G Mendes, “Bylaw Enforcement: Remedies
from Fines to Injunctions and Evicting Owners” (27 April 2012), online: <lmlaw.ca/
wp-content/uploads/2013/12/REMEDIES-FROM-FINES-TO-INJUNCTIONS-ANDEVICTING-OWNERS.pdf>.
Dennis Pavlich, Condominium Law in British Columbia (Vancouver: Butterworth, 1983) at
2. Pavlich notes that:
A leasehold estate, even buttressed by the security of tenure provisions of the Residential
Tenancy Act, does not, in the ordinary course of events, afford the same protection as an
estate in fee simple. A condominium interest held in fee simple assures the owner that he can
never be evicted.
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Since Korolekh in 2010, there have been five reported condominium eviction
and sale orders from the Ontario Superior Courts,6 and two more from the
British Columbia Supreme Court.7 A third decision from British Columbia
involving a 99-year leasehold interest within a multi-unit structure (which uses
lease agreements to emulate condominium ownership) cited the condominium
case law in ordering that a leaseholder forfeit her interest.8 The same courts have
declined to make eviction and sale orders in three other reported decisions since
2010, ordering instead that the title holder comply with the condominium
legislation and by-laws, but noting in each that an eviction and sale order
remained in reserve should the behaviour continue.9
While Korolekh has become a touchstone for eviction and sale orders, there
is an earlier reported case. In 2008, two years before Korolekh, the Ontario
Superior Court ordered another condominium owner to vacate and sell her
apartment. In Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No 946 v
JVM, Justice J Macdonald concluded that JVM, who suffered from paranoid
schizophrenia, created such “a health and safety risk” to the other owners that
it was necessary to order her removal.10 All involved in the litigation accepted
that the problematic behaviour—accumulation of garbage, pest infestations,
overflowing toilets, damage to condominium property, and occasional violent
outbursts—was a result of her illness. The decision to expel her turned on whether
the condominium corporation had met its obligation, under the Ontario Human
Rights Code, to accommodate her disability to the point of undue hardship.11
Justice Macdonald, in ordering eviction and sale, confirmed that it had.12
6.

Waterloo North Condominium v Webb, 2011 ONSC 2365, [2011] OJ No 2195 [Webb];
York Condominium Corp No 82 v Singh, 2013 ONSC 2066, 228 ACWS (3d) 572 [Singh];
Peel Condominium Corp No 304 v Hirsi, 2014 ONSC 346, 236 ACWS (3d) 1038 [Hirsi];
York Condominium Corp No 301 v James, 2014 ONSC 2638, 240 ACWS (3d) 223 [James];
Carleton Condominium Corp No 348 v Chevalier, 2014 ONSC 3859, 241 ACWS (3d)
978 [Chevalier].
7. The Owners Strata Plan LMS 2768 v Jordison, 2013 BCCA 484, 52 BCLR (5th) 245 [Jordison
(2013), BCCA]; Bea v The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 2138, 2015 BCCA 31, 94 CPC (6th)
117 [Bea, BCCA].
8. Westsea Construction Ltd v Mathers, 2014 BCSC 143, 237 ACWS (3d) 215 [Westsea].
9. See York Condominium Corp No 137 v Hayes, 2012 ONSC 4590 at para 57, 20 RPR (5th)
154 [Hayes]; Peel Condominium Corp No 98 v Pereira, 2013 ONSC 7340 at para 80, 235
ACWS (3d) 832 [Pereira]; Strata Plan VR 390 v Harvey, 2013 BCSC 2293 at para 155, 236
ACWS (3d) 1003 [Harvey].
10. Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No 946 v JVM, [2008] OJ No 5412 at paras
105, 108, 173, ACWS (3d) 1236 (Sup Ct) [JVM].
11. Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H 19, ss 2(1), 10, 11, 17.
12. JVM, supra note 10 at paras 87–98.
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The courts have used Korolekh as precedent for eviction and sale orders within
condominium, but JVM, with its explicit consideration of mental disorder, has
hardly been noticed.13 However, the presence of some form of mental disorder is
not peculiar to JVM. The courts have noted mental illness or disability in five of
the other nine cases in which they have granted eviction and sale orders.14 The
references in these cases are fleeting, usually limited to passing mention, and
sometimes only to an acknowledgement that the owner confronting eviction and
forced sale had raised the issue. The courts have largely avoided the question of
whether the presence of mental disorder should bear on the outcome, even as a
pattern is emerging that it is a contributing factor in the majority of cases that
lead to an order for eviction and sale.
This article has three Parts. First, I describe in Part II a new development
in Canadian property law: court-ordered expulsions from condominium for
anti-social behaviour. I begin with a brief survey of the approaches in other
jurisdictions before turning to Ontario and British Columbia, the two most
populous common law jurisdictions in Canada and those in which condominium
ownership is most pronounced.15 The analysis proceeds chronologically,
commencing with JVM, then Korolekh and the eight reported decisions that
follow. In these cases, the courts expel condominium owners pursuant to
discretionary powers granted in provincial condominium statutes intended to
enable courts to enforce compliance with the legislation,16 or under the rules of
civil procedure and the inherent jurisdiction of the courts to fashion appropriate
sanctions for contempt of court.17 There is no mention of eviction and sale orders
for anti-social behaviour in either the condominium statutes or the rules of civil
procedure that govern contempt of court, and until these cases there was no
precedent for such orders as part of the courts’ inherent jurisdiction in contempt
of court proceedings. The orders, which Michael Kim describes as banishing

13. James, supra note 6 at para 20, includes JVM in a list of relevant decisions. That list is
acknowledged in Chevalier, supra note 6 at para 22.
14. Webb, supra note 6 at para 12; James, supra note 6 at para 22; Chevalier, supra note 6 at para
24; Westsea, supra note 8 at paras 30, 35; The Owners Strata Plan LMS 2768 v Jordison, 2012
BCSC 31 at para 11, 346 DLR (4th) 721 [Jordison (2012), BCSC].
15. On the proliferation of condominium ownership in British Columbia and Ontario, see
Douglas C Harris, “Condominium and the City: The Rise of Property in Vancouver”
(2011) 36:3 L & Soc Inquiry 694; Gillad Rosen & Alan Walks, “Castles in Toronto’s Sky:
Condo-ism as Urban Transformation” (2014) 37:3 J Urban Aff 289.
16. Condominium Act, 1998, SO 1998, c 19, s 134 [Condominium Act]; Strata Property Act, SBC
1998, c 43, s 173 [Strata Property Act].
17. Singh, supra note 6; Bea, BCCA, supra note 7.
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or physically and legally expelling owners from condominium,18 are a new and
significant development in Canadian property law.
Second, I argue in Part III that the eviction and sale orders are reconstructing
ownership and redistributing property within condominium. By reconstruction
I mean that the courts, in exposing owners to the possibility of eviction and sale
orders for anti-social behaviour, are diverging from long-held and well-established
conceptions of what it means to be an owner of an interest in land. Anti-social
behaviour has never been a ground in common law jurisdictions on which
neighbours could seek an order to evict an owner and force the sale of her
property. The recent willingness of courts to use these orders is diminishing the
security of property for some, but simultaneously enhancing the property of a
great many more. This is because those within condominium who are grappling
with a neighbour’s anti-social behaviour have access to a remedy—the expulsion
of an owner—that is not available to those outside condominium. As a result, the
eviction and sale orders act as a sanction against a few, but a remedy for many.
They are not only reconstructing ownership but also redistributing property
within condominium, for the enhanced ownership that some enjoy is won
through the diminished security of property that others suffer.
Third, in Part IV, I conclude that the reconstruction of ownership is a
function, at least in part, of the spatial reorganization of owners. In common
law systems, the freehold or fee simple interest in land is generally understood
to confer the status of “owner.” Those holding long-term leasehold interests,
commonly of 99 years, have also been described as “leasehold owners,”19 but the
freehold interest has been the unmodified marker of ownership. The meaning of
ownership in land developed in a context where owners were dispersed over the
surface of the earth in a single layer. Combining multiple freehold interests within
a single building was possible at common law, but difficult and rare.20 Statutory
condominium has changed this. Owners can now be stacked in a vertical column
many stories high, and the courts are responding to the massive increase in the
density of owners by changing what it means to be an owner. This article ends
by asking whether the judicial reconstruction of ownership is an appropriate
response to the spatial reorganization of owners and the resulting challenges
18. Michael C Kim, “Involuntary Sale: Banishing an Owner from the Condominium
Community” (1998) 31:2 John Marshall L Rev 429 at 431 (introduces the idea of physical
and legal expulsion).
19. See e.g. Susan Bright, Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (Oxford: Hart, 2007) at 226;
Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th ed (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009) at para 4.1.10.
20. Harris, supra note 15 at 698–99.
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posed by anti-social behaviour when the behaviour is frequently attributable,
at least in part, to some form of mental disorder.
Before proceeding, a note about how to characterize the behaviour that is
leading to eviction and sale orders. The conduct that warrants expulsion usually
involves inappropriate personal behaviour ranging from distasteful, disgusting,
and disturbing, to violent acts and dangerous criminal activity. In a few cases,
it is the inappropriate use of private units in violation of the condominium
by-laws and, in some cases, criminal laws.21 The courts have also considered,
but not granted, eviction and sale orders to address unauthorized renovation.22
In studies of disorderly conduct in the housing context, most of it focusing on
rental housing in the United Kingdom and Europe, scholars have adopted the
term “anti-social behaviour” to capture activities that harass, alarm, or distress
neighbours.23 However, the Ontario and British Columbia courts rarely use this
term. Instead, they most commonly describe the behaviour as “misconduct,” as
in Korolekh: “this case is a ‘perfect storm’ where the misconduct is serious and
persistent.”24 The principal exception is JVM, where the court uses the more
neutral “conduct” and characterizes the effects of the conduct, rather than the
conduct itself, as unacceptable.25 The justices in the two other cases that engage
most directly with the issue of mental disorder use the phrase “unacceptable and
antisocial behaviour.”26 I use “anti-social behaviour” because it best captures the
21. Singh, supra note 6 (involved using a residential unit to sell alcohol and cigarettes).
22. Harvey, supra note 9. For more information on the distinction between inappropriate use and
inappropriate personal behaviour, see Cornelius Van Der Merwe, ed, European Condominium
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) at 230-313, 371-97 [Van Der Merwe,
Condominium Law]. Case 4 (at 230) analyzes different approaches to inappropriate use,
including unauthorized renovation, while Case 6 (at 371) considers inappropriate personal
behaviour. For a study that employs finer grain distinctions between forms of anti-social
behaviour, see M Vols, PG Tassenaar & JPAM Jacobs, “Anti-social Behaviour and European
Protection against Eviction” (2015) 7:2 Int’l J L in the Built Env 148.
23. See Caroline Hunter, Judy Nixon & Michele Slatter, “Neighbours Behaving Badly:
Anti-Social Behaviour, Property Rights and Exclusion in England and Australia” (2005)
5 Macq LJ 149; John Flint, ed, Housing, Urban Governance and Anti-social Behaviour:
Perspectives, Policy and Practice (Bristol: Policy Press, 2006); John Flint & Judy Nixon,
“Governing Neighbours: Anti-social Behaviour Orders and New Forms of Regulating
Conduct in the UK” (2006) 42:5-6 Urban Studies 939; Andrew Millie, Anti-Social Behaviour
(Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2009); Michel Vols, Marvin Kiehl & Julian Sidoli del
Ceno, “Human Rights and Protection against Eviction in Anti-social Behaviour Cases in the
Netherlands and Germany” (2015) 2 Eur J Comp L & Gov 156.
24. Korolekh, supra note 1 at para 87.
25. JVM, supra note 10 at para 20.
26. James, supra note 6 at para 21; Chevalier, supra note 6 at para 23.
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character of the conduct and its damaging effects without importing a judgment
of wrongdoing that may not be appropriate where mental disorder is involved.
Finally, I use “mental disorder” to encompass mental illness and mental incapacity
caused by something other than illness, such as head trauma.

II. EXPULSION FROM CONDOMINIUM
Condominium property is primarily a creature of statute. Introduced across
Canada in the 1960s, it exists under a number of different labels—“condominium”
or “strata property” in the common law provinces, and “divided co-ownership”
in the civil law jurisdiction of Quebec—but the form of ownership is similar.27
Among the various legal structures that mark out property rights within
multi-unit developments, the creation of individual titles for each unit is the
principal distinguishing feature of condominium.28 Unit holders are title holders,
and the titles are accompanied by a co-ownership interest (held with other title
holders) in the common property, a right to participate in governing the private
and common property (through the condominium corporation, strata council,
or co-ownership syndicate), and an obligation to contribute to the maintenance
of the common property. This is the package of rights and obligations that
comprises ownership within condominium, but it is the presence of individual
titles—and thus the status of owner—that provokes particular scrutiny when
courts consider eviction and sale orders for anti-social behaviour.
The capacity to evict owners from condominium and to force the sale of their
units for anti-social behaviour varies among jurisdictions, as a recent comparative
study of European and South African condominium law reveals.29 Toward
one of end of the spectrum, France does not permit eviction and forced sale,
on the grounds that ownership is inviolable and the property rights of all within
condominium are equal.30 Spain and Catalonia do not permit forced sale but
allow a court to suspend rights of use for several years (three years in Spain, two
27. For early analyses, see Alvin Rosenberg, Condominium in Canada (Toronto: Canada Law
Book, 1969); RCB Risk, “Condominiums and Canada” (1968) 18:1 UTLJ 1.
28. See Peter Butt, Land Law, 6th ed (Sydney: Lawbook Co, 2010) at 854-57; Harris, supra
note 15 at 698-99.
29. Van Der Merwe, Condominium Law, supra note 22. See also Cornelius Van der Merwe,
“European Condominium Law: Nine Key Choices” in Amnon Lehavi, ed, Private
Communities and Urban Governance: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives (Cham,
Switzerland: Springer, 2016) 127 at 136-40.
30. Van Der Merwe, Condominium Law, supra note 22 at 385. Belgium (at 377) and Portugal (at
392) also do not permit eviction and forced sale.
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in Catalonia).31 South Africa’s sectional title legislation does not address eviction
and forced sale, but a judicial decision involving the use of a sectional title unit
for drug dealing and prostitution suggests it may be appropriate to “deprive
the owner and/or occupier of the right to reside in or use a unit” for chronic
misconduct.32 The court does not mention forced sale, and it declined the make
the eviction order, but nonetheless appeared to endorse the Spanish approach.33
At the other end of the spectrum, a majority of civil law jurisdictions in Europe
allow for eviction and forced sale in circumstances of inappropriate personal
behaviour.34 A small subset permits eviction and sale orders for inappropriate
use as well.35 The common law jurisdictions in Europe tend towards long-term
leasehold arrangements rather than statute-based condominium to structure
ownership in multi-unit developments, but there is no indication that the holder
of commonhold title (the little-used version of condominium in England and
Wales) would be subject to an eviction and sale order for anti-social behaviour.36
Condominium statutes in common law jurisdictions do not list eviction
and sale orders as a possible response to an owner’s anti-social behaviour, and
the courts have been hesitant to use them. In the Australian strata title regimes,
Caroline Hunter et al noted in 2005 that “[i]ntransigent non-compliance [with
strata by-laws] does not run the risk of forced sale and removal,” and this appears
to remain the case.37 In his 1997 study of condominium legislation and case
law in the United States, Kim found that “no condominium enabling statute

31. Ibid at 249-50, 378-79 (Catalonia), 396-97 (Spain). See also Cornelius Van Der Merwe &
Luis Muniz-Argüelles, “Enforcement of Conduct Rules in an Apartment or Condominium
Ownership Scheme” in Sabin Arkan & Aynur Yongalik, eds, Festchrift liber amicorum Tuğrul
Ansay (Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2006) 247 at 263-65.
32. Body Corporate of the Shaftesbury Sectional Title Scheme v Estate of the Late Wilhelm Rippert
and Others, (4542/02) [2002] ZAWCHC 15 at 11, [2003] 2 All SA 233 [Shaftesbury]. See
also Van Der Merwe, Condominium Law, supra note 22 at 394-96; GJ Pienaar, Sectional
Titles and Other Fragmented Property Schemes (Cape Town: Juta & Co, 2010) at 210, 383.
In addition, see the discussion in Part IV, below.
33. See Cornelius Van Der Merwe & Juann Booysen, “A critical evaluation of the sanctions
available to remove chronic troublemakers from sectional title schemes” in Johan M
Potgieter, Johann Knobel, & Rita-Marie Jansen, eds, Essays in Honour of Professor Johann
Neethling (Durban: LexisNexis, 2015) 483.
34. Van Der Merwe, Condominium Law, supra note 22 at 376-77 (Austria), 379 (Croatia),
381-82 (Denmark), 383 (Estonia), 385-86 (Germany), 389 (Netherlands), 390 (Norway),
391 (Poland), 393-94 (Slovenia), 397-98 (Sweden).
35. Ibid at 256 (Croatia), 260 (Denmark).
36. Ibid at 382.
37. Hunter, Nixon & Slatter, supra note 23 at 154.
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expressly deals with the validity of an involuntary sale remedy provision.”38
However, the absence of specific statutory authorization is not prohibition, and
Kim noted that condominium by-laws commonly allow a condominium board
to seek a court-ordered involuntary sale where an owner refuses to respect the
rules. Notwithstanding the prevalence of these by-laws, he could not locate any
appellate court orders directing an involuntary sale for failure to live by the rules
of an association and he suggested that these provisions might be unenforceable.39
Since that study, a 2011 decision in the Tennessee Court of Appeal to evict a
“hoarder” and force the sale of her unit indicates that, at least in some states, the
by-laws are enforceable.40
Across North America, Quebec is the only jurisdiction to specify in its
divided co-ownership legislation that court-ordered sale may be an appropriate
response to anti-social behaviour. The Quebec Civil Code provides that if the
actions of a co-owner, in violation of the declaration of divided co-ownership
(the constituting document and by-laws), cause “serious and irreparable injury”
to the co-ownership syndicate or to other co-owners, then the injured parties
may seek an injunction to compel the co-owner to comply. If the co-owner does
not comply, then “the court may, in addition to other penalties … order the sale
of the co-owner’s fraction.”41 In effect, the co-owner who violates the declaration
and a court order to comply with the declaration may be expelled.
The condominium statutes in Ontario and British Columbia do not specify
particular orders for anti-social behaviour, but instead provide the courts with
broad discretion that they have used to grant eviction and sale orders. In Ontario,
the orders arise from three sections in the province’s Condominium Act: section
117 prohibits conduct that is “likely to damage the property or cause injury to an
individual,” section 119(1) compels title holders and occupiers to comply with
the Act and any by-laws established under the Act, and section 134 provides the
courts with discretion to make “an order enforcing compliance” with the Act or
38. For the United States, see Kim, supra note 18 at 436.
39. Ibid at 433. See also Michael R Fierro, “Condominium Association Remedies against
a Recalcitrant Unit Owner” (1999) 73:1 St John’s L Rev 247 at 272. Fierro notes that
“[e]victing a condominium unit owner may continue to be as difficult as expelling an
annoying neighbour in the house next door.”
40. 4215 Harding Road Homeowners Association v Stacy Harris, 354 SW (3d) 296 (Tenn
CA 2011) [Stacy Harris]. The American Psychiatric Association recently re-categorized
“hoarding” as a distinct mental disorder, but the reasons for the decision only deal with the
health and safety issues and not with what bearing the presence of a mental disorder should
have on the appropriate court order. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed (Arlington: American Psychiatric, 2013).
41. Art 1080 CCQ.
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the by-laws or “other such relief as is fair and equitable in the circumstances.”42
As a result, in applications against a title holder for eviction and sale orders, the
courts must determine, first, whether the title holder has engaged in conduct that
is prohibited under the Act or the condominium by-laws, and second, whether
the prohibited conduct warrants eviction and forced sale.
The Ontario Superior Court’s first reported use of an eviction and sale
order to enforce compliance with the Condominium Act is its 2008 decision in
JVM.43 In 1992, JVM purchased an apartment in a multi-story condominium
building in downtown Toronto. The other owners encountered problems almost
immediately.44 These included the accumulation of garbage in her apartment
and the hallway outside, foul odours and pests emanating from the apartment,
and plugged and overflowing toilets causing water damage. When the building
manager attempted to investigate, JVM refused to open her door and, within a
few months of buying into the condominium, she was forcibly removed from the
apartment by the police and hospitalized.
JVM suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. The illness preceded her
acquisition of the condominium apartment, and the behaviour that caused
problems for the other residents escalated when she and her doctors were unable
to manage the illness. In the ensuing years, police officers, firefighters, and
paramedics were called to JVM’s apartment on numerous occasions, visits that
sometimes led to her forcible removal from a filthy, garbage-filled apartment, and
hospitalization. The apartment would be cleaned and JVM would return, but she
would be unable to care for herself and the cycle of removal and hospitalization
would continue. In 2004, the condominium corporation turned to the courts for
an order to expel her. The court declined, instead making a “last chance” order
that JVM comply with the condominium by-laws or face eviction and forced
sale.45 In doing so, Justice E. Macdonald found:

42. Condominium Act, supra note 16, s 134(1) and (3). In the Condominium Act as amended by
the Protecting Condominium Owners Act, 2015, SO 2015, c 28, Schedule 1, s 118, Ontario
added section 135.1 to indicate in 135.1(1) that the courts could order “a person to vacate
a property permanently” if (a) they posed “a serious risk (i) to the health and safety of an
individual, or (ii) of damage to the property or the assets, if any, of the corporation,” or
(b) if non-compliance with a court order demonstrated that “(i) the person is unsuited for
the communal occupation of the property or communal use of the property, and (ii) no other
order will be adequate to enforce compliance.” The amendment, which does not address
forced sale, is not yet in force.
43. JVM, supra note 10.
44. See the summary of the agreed statement of facts. Ibid at para 63.
45. Ibid at paras 14-16.
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The Corporation has demonstrated that it has displayed great sympathy to the
unique circumstances of the Respondent who is seriously disabled. The matter has
a ten year history. It is this court’s duty to balance her interests with those of the
adjoining owners and the Corporation itself.
It is undisputed that the Corporation has done everything in its power to resolve the
situation. The history of the matter suggests that there is a distinct probability that
the cycles of the past w[ill] repeat in the future.46

After this intervention, JVM controlled her illness for a time, but by 2007, her
condition had deteriorated and she began cycling through periods of involuntary
hospitalization. When she was in the apartment, her behaviour created health and
safety risks for the other residents. In 2008, the province appointed the Office
of the Public Guardian and Trustee to manage her affairs and the condominium
corporation returned to court for an eviction and sale order. This time, Justice J.
Macdonald ordered the eviction and sale.47 In doing so, he declined to accept the
argument of the Public Guardian that to evict JVM was to discriminate against
her on the basis of disability in violation of the Ontario Human Rights Code.48
The condominium corporation had a duty to accommodate JVM’s disability,
but he concluded that it had done so to the point of undue hardship as required
under the Code.49
JVM was a case involving self-inflicted harm that caused serious health and
safety risks to the other residents in the condominium property. Most of the
other eviction and sale orders stem from an owner’s aggressive and threatening
behaviour towards other residents. This includes Korolekh, the most widely cited
eviction and forced sale precedent.50
In Korolekh, the owners in the thirty-unit, two-level townhouse development
in downtown Toronto sought to remove Natalia Korolekh on the grounds of
“serious and wide-ranging” misconduct.51 Ms. Korolekh denied the allegations—
set out in lengthy affidavit evidence from other title holders, the property manager,
and a neighbouring resident who was not part of the condominium property—
but did not otherwise address or engage the specific complaints about her
behaviour.52 Justice Code concluded that she had damaged property and injured
other owners, in breach of section 117, and that an eviction and forced sale order
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Ibid at para 12.
Ibid at para 109.
Ibid at para 5.
Ibid at para 88.
Korolekh, supra note 1.
Ibid at para 2.
Ibid at paras 6-46.
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was “justified in the unusual circumstances.”53 Those circumstances were, first,
that the community was small, with prominent communal space, and that the
defendant’s conduct had “effectively destroyed” the utility of that space.54 Second,
the misconduct was extreme—including physical violence, damage to property,
“extraordinary verbal abuse,” and frightening residents with a large dog—and
was carried out in a “devious, persistent and vindictive manner.”55 Third, the
defendant had not complied with orders from the condominium corporation
or heeded its warnings, nor had the current court proceedings caused her to
modify her behaviour. Finally, given the breadth of the defendant’s misconduct,
a compliance order would involve the court in supervising her behaviour and
the courts “ought not to become involved in any long term attempt to oversee,
manage and reform the broad array of extreme behaviour” exhibited in this case.
These factors comprised a “perfect storm” and justified an eviction and forced sale
order.56 Justice Code continued:
In all these circumstances, it would be unwise to try to reintegrate Ms. Korolekh into
a community that fears her and that she has persistently tried to intimidate. People
join condominium corporations voluntarily on the basis that they agree to share
certain collective property and to abide by a set of rules and obligations that protect
that collectivity. There is no right to continue membership in this corporation or
this community, once a clear intention to harm it and a persistent refusal to abide
by its rules have been exhibited in the extreme ways seen in this case. Ms. Korolekh
has irreparably broken the bond with her community and an effective order cannot
be made that would force these parties to now join together again.57

In highlighting the “community” aspects of condominium, Justice Code
downplayed the individual titles that feature prominently in condominium
ownership. In fact, the capacity to hold individual titles within a multi-unit
property is one of the defining and attractive features of condominium. More
commonly than not, the owners within condominium endure rather than
embrace the “community” in order to hold separate titles. However, in this case it
appears that the group of owners had forged some collective identity around the
sharing of communal space, which the actions of Ms. Korolekh had destroyed.
The decision in Korolekh was followed within a year by another reported
eviction and sale order in Waterloo North Condominium v Webb.58 Urbane
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Ibid at para 86.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 87.
Ibid at para 88.
Webb, supra note 6.
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Lorenzo Webb had been convicted of and served jail time for criminal offences
against other owners within the condominium. He represented himself in the
proceedings and did not contest the allegations of misconduct, but instead alleged
financial and procedural impropriety by the condominium corporation. In a brief
decision, Justice M.D. Parayeski concluded that even accepting Mr. Webb’s
allegations, they “would not justify or in any way rationalize his behaviour.”59 In
the penultimate paragraph Justice Parayeski acknowledged several other factors
that might explain Mr. Webb’s conduct:
The respondent says, and I accept as true, that he has suffered a brain injury and
that he had a difficult childhood. Neither of these facts, however unfortunate and
deserving of sympathy as they may be, can justify his conduct.60

The self-represented Mr. Webb does not appear to have introduced other
evidence to corroborate the brain injury or its impact on his behaviour, but it
is not clear that additional evidence would have changed the outcome. Justice
Parayeski acknowledged the “drastic” character of an eviction and forced sale
order, but “[g]iven the history of the respondent’s behaviour and that even the
serving of jail time has not proven effective in curbing his conduct,” determined
that such an order was necessary to deliver the “basic security and the quiet
enjoyment” to which the other owners were entitled.61 In listing these attributes
of ownership within condominium, Justice Parayeski slipped into the realm of
leasehold interests where the right to “quiet enjoyment” is at the core of every
tenancy, and where eviction for the conduct exhibited in this case would be
unexceptional, at least for the relatively short term leases to which the residential
tenancy legislation applies and that do not secure the status of leasehold owner.
“Quiet enjoyment” is not a term that is commonly associated with freehold
interests; its use in this case was an early, and perhaps unintentional signal of a
willingness to rethink ownership within condominium.
In 2012, the British Columbia Supreme Court turned to Korolekh and
Webb when it granted what appears to be the province’s first reported eviction
and sale order in response to anti-social behaviour within strata property.
In The Owners Strata Plan LMS 2768 v Jordison, the court concluded that Rose
Jordison, who owned an apartment in a 137-unit strata property development,
and her adult son, Jordy Jordison, who lived with her, had abused and harassed
other title holders with foul language, obscene gestures, intimidating behaviour,
59. Ibid at para 5.
60. Ibid at para 12.
61. Ibid at paras 9-10.
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and unacceptably loud noise.62 The behaviour had continued for four years, and
neither warnings from the strata council nor $20,000 in fines had prompted the
Jordisons to temper their behaviour. In desperation, the other owners sought an
eviction and sale order to expel the Jordisons from the condominium. Justice
Blair concluded the province’s strata property legislation provided the court with
the authority to make such an order and that it was a proportionate response in
the circumstances. In doing so, he noted that although the Jordisons’ conduct
was not “as extreme” as that in Korolekh, it still justified the “draconian” eviction
and forced sale order so that “harmony may be reinstated within the Strata.”63
He also noted that Ms. Jordison had alleged discrimination against her son on
the grounds of disability in another proceeding:
Ms. Jordison filed a complaint with the Human Rights Tribunal (the “Tribunal”)
that the Strata’s actions against her were discriminatory because the activities about
which the Strata complained were the result of her son’s physical and intellectual
disabilities caused by the autism with which she asserted her son suffered. …The
Jordisons did not file the medical evidence and withdrew their complaint from the
Tribunal.64

The allegation is not mentioned again in the decision or in the three Jordison
decisions that would follow.
The Jordisons had not appeared at trial, but on appeal they succeeded in
overturning the order. The British Columbia Court of Appeal ruled that unlike
the Ontario legislation, which provides courts with broad discretionary power
to make eviction and sale orders on the initial application from aggrieved
owners, British Columbia’s Strata Property Act requires a breach of a prior order
before a court may expel an owner from condominium.65 Sections 173(a) and
(b) permit the courts to order an owner to perform a required duty under the
Act, or to stop contravening the Act, and section 173(c) enables the courts to
make “any other orders it considers necessary to give effect to an order under
paragraph (a) or (b).”66 Given the explicit reference to the earlier paragraphs, the
Court of Appeal ruled that paragraph (c) was “designed to enhance the efficacy
of the two preceding subsections,” and therefore that the broad discretionary
authority it conveys could only be exercised in support of a prior order to
62.
63.
64.
65.

Jordison (2012), BCSC, supra note 14.
Ibid at paras 81-82.
Ibid at para 11.
The Owners Strata Plan LMS 2768 v Jordison, 2012 BCCA 303, 35 BCLR (5th) 36
[Jordison (2012), BCCA].
66. Condominium Act, supra note 16.
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perform a required duty or stop contravening the Act.67 It upheld the trial court’s
order that the Jordisons stop making loud noises, obscene gestures, and abusive
and intimidating comments directed at other title holders, and more generally
that they comply with the Strata Property Act and strata property by-laws, but
overturned the eviction and sale order.68
In 2013, the owners in strata plan LMS 2768 were back in court, alleging
that the Jordisons’ misconduct had continued unabated and arguing that an
order for eviction and sale was now warranted because the Jordisons were in
contempt of the prior order.69 The trial court agreed, and this time so did the
Court of Appeal:
The competing private property interest … must, in my opinion, yield to the rights
and duties of the collective as embodied in the bylaws and enforceable by court
order. The old adage “a man’s home is his castle” is subordinated by the exigencies of
modern living in a condominium setting.70

Moreover, the Jordisons “have repudiated the cooperative foundation of strata
living and their intolerable behaviour has brought about the forced sale.”71
In making this order, the Court of Appeal established an approach that emulated
the rule in Quebec’s Civil Code: Orders for eviction and forced sale were available,
but only where the owner was in contempt of a prior court order.72
Following the decisions in Korolekh, Webb, and Jordison, the courts in
Ontario seemed to pause in their willingness to use eviction and sale orders against
owners for inappropriate personal behaviour. In York Condominium Corp No
137 v Hayes, the Ontario Superior Court accepted the evidence of other owners
that Edna Merle Hayes “committed no less than five physical assaults on other
condominium unit owners or occupiers and, in several other instances, engaged
in verbal abuse, threats and intimidation in relation to a board member, other
unit owners or occupiers and service providers to the condominium.”73 However,
although she “repeatedly intimidated and instilled fear in a number of her fellow
members of this community,” the behaviour did not warrant expulsion.74 That
order was “the ultimate and harshest remedy available,” and “should be reserved
67. Jordison (2012), BCCA, supra note 65 at para 14.
68. Ibid at para 18.
69. The Owners Strata Plan LMS 2768 v Jordison, 2013 BCSC 487, 227 ACWS (3d) 267
[Jordison (2013), BCSC].
70. Jordison (2013), BCCA, supra note 7 at para 25.
71. Ibid at para 27.
72. CCQ, supra note 41.
73. Hayes, supra note 9 at para 26.
74. Ibid.
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for the most egregious cases.”75 Similarly, in Peel Condominium Corp v Pereira, the
Superior Court found that Rui Pereira, over a period of 10 years, had “behaved in
an inappropriate and abusive manner … including the repeated use of threatening
and offensive language,”76 but that “while the actions of Mr. Pereira are extremely
serious and troubling,” they did not warrant an eviction and sale order.77 In both
cases, the Superior Court granted compliance orders, but noted that eviction and
sale orders remained in reserve should the inappropriate conduct continue.78
If Hayes and Pereira signalled a drift away from court ordered evictions and
sales in circumstances of inappropriate personal behaviour, a trio of Ontario
cases and one decision from British Columbia in 2014 reversed the trend. In its
brief decision in Peel Condominium Corp No 304 v Hirsi, the Ontario Superior
Court granted an order to sell Ms. Lull Hirsi’s unit following a finding that the
“incorrigible and unmanageable” defendant had engaged in “outrageous and
persistent conduct,” including “incidents of stabbing and shooting and other
intolerable conduct,” which had an “exceptional impact on a building occupied
by law abiding senior citizens.”79 This was the “perfect storm” that justified an
order to sell.80
Several months later, the Ontario Superior Court considered another
application for an eviction and sale order in York Condominium Corp No 301 v
James.81 Valerie Victoria James was subject to an earlier court order not to enter
the common areas (except as needed to access her unit), not to have any contact
with other owners or employees of the condominium, not to come within 25
feet of any individuals who had sworn affidavits in the proceedings, not to come
within 25 feet of the management office, and not to disturb “the comfort and
quiet enjoyment” of other owners and their visitors.82 The order was an attempt
to address what was described in the affidavits as violent, abusive, harassing,
threatening, aggressive, intimidating, and inappropriate behaviour.83 Within
a month, Ms. James had breached the order repeatedly, and the court ordered

75.
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77.
78.
79.
80.
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Ibid at para 55.
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Hirsi, supra note 6 at para 2.
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that she undergo a mental health examination.84 When she breached that order
as well, the court appointed the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee as
litigation guardian, and a few days later she was arrested under provisions in the
Mental Health Act.85
When the matter appeared before Justice B.P. O’Marra as an application
for an eviction and sale order, the litigation guardian informed the court that
since her release from hospital one month earlier, Ms. James had been on her
medication and that there had been no further incidents. Even so, Justice O’Marra
expressed concern that “[p]revious court orders were not sufficient to control
the unacceptable and antisocial behaviour” and that her behaviour “presented
a series of health and safety issues for other residents, management and visitors
to the condominium corporation.”86 In granting the order, he addressed her
mental disorder:
Unfortunately, the respondent suffers from a mental illness. I appreciate that it will
be a hardship for her to vacate the unit and have the unit sold. However, it must be
borne in mind that while the applicant is a corporate body, it is the men, women
and children who live and work in the building and their visitors and guests who
have been confronted with behaviour that ranges from disturbing to disgusting to
threatening. I do not see remedies short of an order vacating the unit and ordering a
sale as sufficient to address the uncontested breaches of the Act and the rules of the
condominium corporation.87

Several weeks after this decision, the Ontario Superior Court released another
decision in which mental disorder appears to have been a factor. In Carleton
Condominium Corp No 348 v Chevalier, the owner (Yves Chevalier) and his
tenant (George Basmadji) were subject to court orders directing them to stop
damaging and making unauthorized alterations to common property, to stop
engaging in conduct that risked the safety of other residents, and to refrain from
engaging in verbally abusive and threatening behaviour.88 When neither police
visits nor the court order caused the conduct to cease, the court issued a second
order to evict the tenant, Mr. Basmadji.89 He refused to leave, and when the
police attempted to remove him, he produced a transfer instrument and claimed
that Mr. Chevalier had transferred the apartment to him. Mr. Basmadji was using
the status of owner to forestall eviction, and it did cause delay. The third court
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
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order voided the purported transfer and authorized the police to remove the
tenant from the unit.90 In making a fourth and final order, this time to evict
Mr. Chevalier and force the sale of the unit, Justice R Beaudoin indicated,
“it is obvious that previous court orders have been insufficient to control the
unacceptable and antisocial behaviour of the Respondents.”91 He also noted that
Mr. Chevalier “suffers from a mental illness.”92 The court (at the request of the
condominium corporation) had asked the Office of the Public Guardian and
Trustee to appoint a property guardian and then litigation guardian during the
first proceedings when it appeared that Mr. Chevalier “was in danger of losing
his house due to non-payment of a relatively small amount of condominium
fees.”93 He would eventually lose title to his condominium unit because of
“unacceptable and antisocial behaviour” that appears to have been due, at least in
part, to mental illness.94
In the midst of the trio of Ontario decisions in 2014, the British Columbia
Supreme Court in Westsea Construction Ltd v Mathers made a forfeiture order
against a leaseholder who was in breach of the lease.95 The residential complex
in Richmond, a suburb of Vancouver, used leasehold interests to emulate a
condominium, and Terrise Mathers, who held a 99-year lease expiring in 2083,
was in default for unpaid operating expenses and an assessment for major repairs.
She was also in breach of multiple provisions of the lease because of the conduct
of her brother, Jeffery Mathers, who occupied the unit. This included dumping
unsightly and hazardous junk in the common areas near the unit, theft of
common property, leaving unlicensed and unregistered vehicles in the car park,
keeping animals, and inviting visitors whom he “knew or ought to have known,
would lead to dangerous conditions for the residents of Sussex Square, namely
a shooting and hostage-taking incident involving police.”96 The self-represented
Ms. Mathers acknowledged that her brother was a hoarder,97 and the court
explained her evidence as follows:
Ms. Mathers says she bought the suite for her brother with the understanding
between them that he would try and stabilize his life. Mr. Mathers suffers from
mental illness for which he takes medication. She has provided a note from his
90.
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family physician that details the effect of that illness on Mr. Mathers’ emotional
health, ability to concentrate and complete his activities of daily living. Ms. Mathers
has looked after Jeffrey for most of his life and they are very close. She says “if we
lose the suite I don’t know what will happen to Jeff.”98

Justice Gropper acknowledged the mental disorder and the efforts of Ms. Mathers
to help her brother, but held that they did not excuse the breaches of the lease
agreement or override the rights of the other residents to the quiet enjoyment
of their units:
I appreciate that Ms. Mathers is doing what she can for her brother who suffers from
a mental illness. However, her brother’s conduct has caused Ms. Mathers to breach
the terms of the agreements that she has with the petitioners. It also interferes with
the quiet enjoyment that the other leaseholders are entitled to in accordance with
their contracts with the petitioners.99

In ordering that Ms. Mathers forfeit her interest for breach of the lease, and in
refusing to grant relief from forfeiture, Justice Gropper drew on the Court of
Appeal decision in Jordison. “[O]ne only need replace the word ‘condominium’
with the wor[d] ‘leasehold,’”100 she wrote in comparing the earlier case with the
one before her and concluding:
Ms. Mathers, by allowing Mr. Mathers to reside in her suite and by failing to take
steps to address his conduct, has undermined the cooperative foundation of this
leasehold setting. As in Jordison, there is “ample evidence… that only a sale would
resolve the problem.”101

She also indicated that the forfeiture order was appropriate because the payments
in arrears were as much or more than the unit’s value.102 If there had been value to
Ms. Mathers in the unit, then it appears Justice Gropper would have entertained
relief from forfeiture, but would have followed Jordison in making an eviction
and sale order instead.
In addition to these cases involving inappropriate personal behaviour, the
Ontario Superior Court made an eviction and sale order in 2013 where the
owners were making inappropriate use of their condominium unit. When York
98.
99.
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101.
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Condominium Corp No 82 v Singh came before the court, Nutan Singh, Narayan
Sundar Singh, and Namita Singh were subject to a prior court order, made under
the Rules of Civil Procedure, prohibiting them from “conducting the business of
selling alcohol and cigarettes” in their unit.103 When the activity continued, the
condominium corporation sought a ruling that they were in contempt of court
and an order for their eviction and the sale of their unit. The action proceeded in
contempt under the Rules of Civil Procedure and under the discretionary powers
granted in the Condominium Act to enforce compliance.104 The court found
the Singhs in contempt of the court order and in breach of the condominium
by-laws, and ordered that they vacate and sell their unit.105
A third category of conduct that might lead to an eviction and sale order—
unauthorized renovation—came before the British Columbia Supreme Court in
Strata Plan VR 390 v Harvey.106 This case involved Wendy Joan Harvey’s repeated
and unauthorized renovation of common property within the strata complex in
violation of by-laws and multiple court orders (one of which levied $70,000 in
special costs) that she and her common-law partner, Douglas Michael Edgar,
refrain from renovating the common property and from impeding access to the
common property. The court indicated, “a strong remedy is necessary,” but did
not order Ms. Harvey to vacate and sell her unit.107 In declining to grant the
“severe and extreme remedy,” the court noted that the problematic renovation
work was substantially complete and thus, the “opportunity for friction between
[strata council and owner] is now significantly diminished.”108 The resulting order
included detailed provisions to prevent Ms. Harvey and Mr. Edgar from interfering
with the strata council’s work on the common property, including stipulations
that they not be present in the building while the work was being done.109
The latest reported decision involving an eviction and forced sale order for
anti-social behaviour—Bea v The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 2138—stems from a

103. Singh, supra note 6 at para 3.
104. Condominium Act, supra note 16, s 134; Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194,
r 60.11(5)(f ).
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have made the eviction and forced sale order primarily on the grounds that the Singhs were
in contempt of court. As a result, the order falls within the court’s broad discretion under the
Rules of Civil Procedure rather than the Condominium Act. See Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO
1990, Reg 194, r 60.11(5).
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dispute over parking.110 In 2006, the owners in the 35-unit strata development
voted to assign parking spaces within the complex to individual units rather than
continue the practice of unrestricted access among them. Huei-Chi Yang Bea,
one of the owners, objected, and she and her husband, Cheng-Fu Bea, filed a
petition with the courts to overturn the decision. The petition was dismissed,
but the Beas persevered, and, as the British Columbia Supreme Court relates,
launched “multiple proceedings in this Court and in the Court of Appeal over
the last six years that have occupied countless court hours, frustrated dozens of
judges, severely tested the patience of the registry staff, and put the strata owners
represented by the respondent to a great deal of expense they can ill afford.”111
The courts made numerous orders, including orders that the Beas not file any
document in relation to the parking dispute. These were ignored, and the courts
fined the Beas for contempt of court. Even so, the petitions and appeals continued
unabated, leading the other owners to approach the courts for an eviction and
sale order against Mrs. Bea.
It was an unusual petition. Although Mrs. Bea owned an apartment in the
condominium, and she and her husband were using that ownership status to
launch multiple proceedings against the strata council, their actions did not
appear to violate the Strata Property Act or the strata by-laws, so the court’s
remedial power under section 173 of the Strata Property Act to make any order
necessary to enforce compliance with a prior order did not apply.112 Instead,
the petition rested on the inherent jurisdiction of the court to craft appropriate
sanctions for contempt of court and on the owners’ argument that the Supreme
Court Civil Rules, which only provided for fines or incarceration as sanctions
for contempt, did not preclude the court from using its inherent jurisdiction to
order the sale of property.113 Nonetheless, Justice Grauer turned to the rulings in
Jordison for guidance and came to a similar conclusion: Eviction and sale was the
only viable and meaningful order.
Normally, a person’s property rights would be irrelevant to the question of an
appropriate sanction for contempt of court. This case is not normal. Here, the
property interest in question is precisely what fuels the Beas’ contemptuous acts
and gives rise to the injustice that results. I conclude that a forced sale is the only
appropriate and meaningful sanction for Mrs. Bea’s contempt of court. In the
unique circumstances of this case, it is a proportional response to the manner in
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which Mrs. Bea has used her ownership interest to frustrate and abuse the court’s
process, and afflict her fellow owners.114

A majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal agreed: seizure and sale
of property fell within the court’s inherent jurisdiction, and the eviction and sale
order was appropriate given the conduct and the circumstances in this case.115
The Court of Appeal’s departure from “normal” sanctions for contempt of court
indicates that the majority understood it was contemplating something new.
Indeed, the courts are using the discretionary provisions in the condominium
legislation and their jurisdiction in contempt of court to reconstruct ownership
within condominium.

III. RECONSTRUCTING OWNERSHIP AND REDISTRIBUTING
PROPERTY
From 2008 to 2015, the courts in Ontario and British Columbia have made
nine reported eviction and sale orders within condominium and one forfeiture
order in a leasehold development to address what they most commonly describe
as misconduct. Described as “draconian,” “extreme,”116 and to be reserved for
the “perfect storm” of chronic, egregious, and destructive misconduct within
condominium,117 the expulsion orders have nonetheless become one of the
available responses to anti-social behaviour. In making the orders, the courts
appear to understand them as a necessary diminution of ownership within
condominium. This sentiment is captured in the British Columbia Court of
Appeal’s use of the well-worn castle metaphor in Jordison:
The competing private property interest … must, in my opinion, yield to the rights
and duties of the collective as embodied in the bylaws and enforceable by court
order. The old adage “a man’s home is his castle” is subordinated by the exigencies of
modern living in a condominium setting.118

In short, individual interests within condominium must defer to the collective
such that ownership within condominium is less robust than it is outside.

114. Ibid at para 66.
115. Bea, BCCA, supra note 7 at paras 76, 89. See Justice Goepel (in dissent), at paras 136-42,
noting that the Supreme Court Civil Rules constrained the inherent jurisdiction of the court
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This change in what it means to be an owner may be described, in the terms
articulated by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, as a shift from the
stronger property rule protection for an entitlement to the weaker liability rule
protection.119 A property rule secures an entitlement by stipulating that it can
only be transferred from its owner with consent, in a voluntary transaction and
for a value accepted by the owner. Conversely, a liability rule provides that an
owner has a right to the objectively determined value of an entitlement, were it
to be taken, but has no right to the entitlement itself. Under a liability rule, the
holder of an entitlement might lose that interest involuntarily, perhaps through
expropriation, but would have a right to compensation. Before the court decisions
reviewed in this article, anti-social behaviour was not a basis for stripping owners
of their property; owners, including those within condominium, were protected
by a property rule that required their consent to the transfer of their property.
Now, however, in circumstances of chronic and extreme anti-social behaviour
within condominium, the courts will diminish the protection for owners such
that they are entitled to the value of their interest—determined objectively
in a court-ordered sale of the interest—but not the interest itself. By making
condominium property vulnerable to confiscation because of anti-social
behaviour, the courts have shifted from property rule to liability rule protection
for owners within condominium.
Another way to describe the change is that the courts have made it a condition
of continuing ownership within condominium that owners maintain a minimum
standard of personal behaviour. This “conditionality” for continuing ownership is
new—retaining ownership has not been subject to meeting minimum standards
of behaviour—although scholars have noted the growing propensity to attach
conditions in order to receive, and to continue to receive, government-distributed
benefits, including welfare and housing.120 In the context of social housing, where
residents usually occupy their units as tenants, attaching conditions that require
certain minimum levels of conduct to be or remain eligible for housing becomes
one means of controlling behaviour. Conditions such as these have not attached
to owners, but now they do, at least within condominium.
The difficulty of fitting the eviction and sale orders into Tony Honoré’s
classic list of the standard incidents of ownership reveals the magnitude of

119. Guido Calabresi & A Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
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the change that the courts are making to ownership.121 The list of incidents is
comprised primarily of rights—to possess, to use, to manage, to the income,
to the capital, et cetera—but also includes “liability to execution” and a “duty
to prevent harm.”122 Honoré restricted the liability, and thus potential loss of
ownership, to non-payment of debt or insolvency; he did not contemplate
liability for anti-social behaviour. It is possible that the court orders for eviction
and sale because of anti-social behaviour might be shoehorned into the “duty
to prevent harm,” but the fit is not obvious. Honoré described this as a duty
to refrain from using, and to prevent others from using, the thing owned in a
manner that might harm others. He took his automobile as an example; it was
something he could use freely, but not in a manner that harmed others. Similarly,
he could build on his land, but not such that the building would collapse on a
neighbouring property. One might characterize the owners who were expelled
from condominium for anti-social behaviour as contravening the prohibition on
harmful use, but the expulsions were not so much for the harmful use of property
as for the effects of personal conduct on others. Fitting these orders within
Honoré’s incidents of ownership requires a broader interpretation of either the
liability or the duty than as Honoré described them. In short, the eviction and
sale orders are reconstructing ownership within condominium in a manner that
is far from trivial.
However, while the general tenor of the judgments suggests that the courts
understand eviction and sale orders as diminishing the nature of ownership
within condominium, the language used to describe the orders reveals something
else. In almost all the cases, the courts label the order as a “remedy” rather than a
“sanction.” In fact, except for the decisions in Bea, which involved the inherent
jurisdiction of the courts to craft sanctions for contempt of court, the courts
hardly use the term “sanction.” It appears in the text of the other decisions
only twice: once in the first trial court decision in Jordison,123 and then in the
second decision by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the same litigation,
where the court uses it simply to indicate that it is deciding the case under the
condominium legislation, not as a sanction for contempt of court.124 Conversely,
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nearly all the courts use the term “remedy” (or variations of it) when considering
an order for eviction and forced sale.125
This use of the term “remedy” to describe the eviction and sale orders is
understandable, particularly in British Columbia where the section conferring
the discretionary power to make them appears under the heading “Other court
remedies.”126 It is also meaningful. “Sanction” in this context suggests a penalty
that serves primarily to diminish ownership within condominium; “remedy”
connotes a beneficial intent, with the purpose of preserving or enhancing
ownership. By labelling the eviction and sale orders as remedies, the courts
are revealing the benefit these orders confer on owners who are dealing with
the anti-social behaviour of a neighbour. In fact, the availability of the order
enhances ownership within condominium in a manner not available to those
who hold property outside it. Owners outside condominium can encourage
the state to invoke criminal punishment where a neighbour’s activity involves
assault or mischief. They may also have recourse to causes of action in tort
such as nuisance. However, the cases considered in this article reveal that these
responses are sometimes inadequate to stop anti-social behaviour. Indeed, it is the
ineffectiveness of all other measures that leads the courts to make the eviction and
sale orders.127 The decision in Webb, where the Ontario Superior Court noted
“even the serving of jail time has not proven effective in curbing his conduct,” is
a striking example.128
The courts in Ontario and British Columbia are providing owners within
condominium a remedy that is not available to those outside condominium: the
physical and legal expulsion of an owner for chronic and egregious anti-social
behaviour. In doing so, they are reconstructing ownership within condominium.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, the principal effect of this reconstruction is to enhance
ownership within condominium, not diminish it. From the perspective of the
owner subject to an eviction and forced sale proceeding, her property interest is
more tenuous than if she held that same interest outside condominium. However,
for all other owners within condominium—including the 29 who sought to
rid themselves of Ms. Korolekh and the 136 who suffered the Jordisons—the
capacity to expel an owner physically and legally with court ordered eviction
and sale enhances their ownership. This is why the courts speak of the eviction
125. But see Webb, supra note 6; Roth, supra note 3 (the exceptions).
126. Strata Property Act, supra note 16, s 173.
127. For a discussion regarding escalating sanctions, see Van Der Merwe &
Muniz-Argüelles, supra note 31.
128. Webb, supra note 6 at para 9.
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and sale orders as remedy rather than sanction. Of course, the direct impact of
these orders depends on an owner’s position. Those who are subject to the orders
suffer a newly established susceptibility and diminished security of their property,
but the vast majority enjoy a remedy that enables them to expel an exceedingly
difficult and, in some cases, dangerous neighbour. As a result, eviction and forced
sale orders have a redistributive effect, enhancing the ownership of most within
condominium, but at the expense of the property of others.
If this reconstruction of ownership is also its redistribution, does this
redistribution follow identifiable patterns? Any conclusions will be tentative
because of the small number of cases, but one clear pattern is emerging: The
courts in Ontario and British Columbia are reconstructing ownership within
condominium primarily as a response to the destructive effects of owners who
suffer some form of mental disorder.

IV. THE SPATIAL REORGANIZATION OF OWNERSHIP
Condominium provides an architecture of ownership that facilitates an increase
in the density of title-holding “owners.” Where there was once a single owner
holding a defined portion of the surface of the earth with a property interest
extending (in common law jurisdictions) upwards to the heavens and downwards
to the centre of the earth—cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos—
after condominium there can be several hundred owners living cheek by jowl
and stacked in a vertical column. In this spatial reorganization of ownership,
property boundaries harden and become ascertainable volumes, defined in three
dimensions by floors, walls, and ceilings of units within buildings, rather than by
the expansiveness and vagueness of Latin maxims.129 Condominium accomplishes
the increased density of owners by combining individual titles to defined units,
undivided shares of common property held in common by each title holder, and
a right to participate in the governance of the private and common property.
In most circumstances, this packaging of rights—coupled with an obligation
to contribute to the maintenance of commonly held property—overcomes the
challenges of multiple owners, each with a spatially defined private interest within
a single building. Indeed, some have argued that the combination of private and
common property within various hybrid or mixed models of ownership, such

129. See Harris, supra note 15 at 699-701.
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as condominium, provide better solutions to governance challenges than either
private or common property alone.130
The density of individual titles that condominium facilitates is new, but the
human density that it helps to produce is not. Residents of multi-unit buildings,
living in close proximity and sharing physical structures and spaces, have most
commonly occupied their private spaces as tenants under a lease, not as title
holders. Within landlord and tenant law, tenants may forfeit their leasehold
interests for cause, including anti-social behaviour. At some point, a tenant’s
disruptive conduct will justify eviction.131 In fact, a landlord may even have an
obligation to evict a disorderly tenant to protect the “quiet enjoyment” of other
tenants. Conversely, a title holder’s right to remain in possession, and to remain
as owner, has not been so fragile. Anti-social behaviour affecting neighbours
has not provided grounds to remove an owner. This immunity for owners has
been, in part, a function of their relative dispersal, which makes the damaging
consequences of anti-social behaviour less acute. Owners have seldom been
stacked on top of each other and have never co-existed in such density before. This
density creates challenges for neighbours, which Michele Slatter, in her study of
hoarding and housing risk, describes as one of the disadvantages of proximity.132
The courts are responding to the challenges of density, or the disadvantages of
proximity, by changing what it means to be an owner within condominium.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the courts are turning to that body of property
law more accustomed to managing a density of individual property interests—
landlord and tenant law—as they reconsider ownership within condominium.
The use of “quiet enjoyment,” one of the essential attributes of a leasehold interest,
to describe the rights of owners within condominium, is a revealing marker of the
legal repertoire that the courts are drawing from as they confront the challenges
created by the heightened density of owners. The sanction within landlord and
tenant law for chronic anti-social behaviour in breach of a lease agreement or of
applicable residential tenancies legislation is forfeiture of the leasehold interest.
Forfeiture orders provide the legal mechanism to expel a tenant for anti-social
behaviour, and it is this capacity to expel that the courts have adopted in the
context of freehold interests within condominium. Instead of forfeiture, the
130. See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A Heller, “The Liberal Commons” (2001) 110 Yale LJ 549;
Amnon Lehavi, “Mixing Property” (2008) 38 Seton Hall L Rev 137.
131. See Residential Tenancies Act, SO 2006, c 17, ss 61-66; Residential Tenancy Act, SBC
2002, c 78, s 47.
132. See Michele Slatter, “Treasures, Trash and Tenure: Hoarding and Housing Risk” (2008) 2:1
People, Place & Pol’y 28 at 33.
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courts order eviction from, and sale of, the freehold interest. The trend appears to
be, as Slatter suggests, to “infuse ‘ownership’ … with aspects of rental.”133
The transfer of inspiration is not unidirectional. Tenants holding long-term
leasehold interests, commonly of 99 years in the case of residential tenancies,
are generally understood as leasehold owners.134 As with those holding freehold
interests, leasehold owners appear to have been immune to expulsion from their
leasehold units for anti-social behaviour. However, this also seems to be changing
such that owners, whether occupying their units within multi-unit dwellings as
freeholders or long-term leaseholders, may be expelled from their residences for
anti-social behaviour.135 The challenges of density are similar, regardless of the
form of tenure, and the courts are finding different ways to the same outcome:
expulsion of the disorderly owner-occupier. Moreover, long-term leasehold is
also possible within condominium—individual units and common property are
held as leasehold rather than freehold interests—although these arrangements
are much less common than freehold, and there are no reported cases in
Ontario or British Columbia involving anti-social behaviour within a leasehold
condominium. Given the emerging willingness of courts to expel freeholders
from condominium for anti-social behaviour, it seems clear that they will also
remove leaseholders for similar conduct. In doing so, the courts are likely to
grant relief from forfeiture and turn to the eviction and sale orders that they
have deployed against freeholders. The leasehold owners would be expelled, but
would be entitled to the value of their interests (following forced sale) rather than
forfeiting them.
This modification of ownership in response to its changing spatial context
should not be surprising. As a social institution that plays a prominent role in
defining relations between people with respect to things, the law of property must
adapt to its context, even as it helps to shape that context. Lee Ann Fennell has
recently called for the reinvention of the fee simple absolute, recommending that
its geographical fixity and perpetual existence be rethought in order to recreate
the property interest in a manner that would facilitate optimal urban land use.136
Legal historian Stuart Banner, in studies of the ownership of airspace and the idea
of ownership in the 19th and 20th century United States, emphasizes the impact
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of technological change on prevailing regimes of property law.137 The invention
of the airplane, for example, prompted a re-evaluation and eventual departure
from the rule, as characterized by Blackstone, that “Land hath also, in its legal
signification, an indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards.”138 The courts
would reshape what it means to own land by limiting the interests of a landowner
to “the airspace directly above the ground” in order to facilitate flight.139 This
modification of the boundaries of ownership was not a necessary outcome, argues
Banner, but only one among a number of possibilities that might enable airplanes
to move through air spaces that had once been divided, under the Latin maxim,
into many private lots protected by actions in trespass.140
Statutory condominium is another innovation that, by enabling a massive
increase in the density of owners, is causing courts to re-evaluate and reconstruct
ownership.141 However, the judicial response has not been to reshape the
physical boundaries of ownership, as in the case of airplanes and airspace, but to
reconstruct ownership in a defined space. For some—those subject to eviction
and sale orders—their property has become less secure in that they may now be
expelled for anti-social behaviour.
The capacity of common-interest communities or developments, including
condominium, to act as technologies of exclusion has drawn considerable
critical attention.142 Some have argued that common-interest developments
construct an architecture of ownership that facilitates the sequestration of those
with property to create enclaves of privilege, memorably labelled “privatopia”
by Evan McKenzie,143 and “Fortress America” by Edward Blakely and Mary
Snyder.144 Others have described common-interest communities as a form
137. See Stuart Banner, Who Owns the Sky? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008)
[Banner, Sky]; Stuart Banner, American Property: A History of How, Why, and What We Own
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
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139. Ibid at 288.
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Douglas C Harris & Nicole Gilewicz, “Dissolving Condominium, Private Takings, and the
Nature of Property” in B Hoops et al, eds, Rethinking Expropriation Law II: Context, Criteria,
and Consequences of Expropriation (The Hague: Eleven, 2015) 263.
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of “civic secession,”145 a “new enclavism,”146 or the “fortress city,”147 detaching
those with means from a sense of responsibility for a larger municipal or public
realm and enabling “government for the nice.”148 Critics have shown that the
proliferation of common-interest developments has exacerbated socio-economic
divisions and racial demarcations.149 However, the scholarship focuses largely on
the common-interest developments of American suburbs, the typically sprawling
character of which has made them targets of critique for reasons other than their
capacity to exclude.150 There has been much less critical attention devoted to
condominium, which has become the ownership structure of choice for multi-unit
dwelling in urban settings.151 However, the use of eviction and sale orders suggest
that the capacity of condominium owners to exclude—to function, in the case of
condominium towers, as vertical gated communities—should be viewed with a
more critical eye. Moreover, it is not just the capacity to exclude those who might
become owners, but also the capacity to expel those who are already owners that
is at issue. The early evidence suggests that the courts are using eviction and sale
orders most commonly to enable private communities of owners to expel those
with a mental disorder that makes it difficult to live in close proximity to others.
Where the courts acknowledge the possibility of mental disorder when
considering an expulsion order, the discussion is usually brief, not amounting to
more than passing mention. In several decisions, the judges express sympathy, and
in James the court makes the eviction and sale order almost apologetically (albeit
with little analysis).152 The lack of engagement with the impact of mental disorders
is partly a function of the limited evidence presented to the courts. Many of the
owners attempting to stave off eviction and sale orders are self-represented, and
145. Sheryll D Cashin, “Privatized Communities and the ‘Secession of the Successful’: Democracy
and Fairness beyond the Gate” (2000) 28:5 Fordham Urb LJ 1675 at 1677-78.
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the judges often have little more to work with than a respondent’s assertion that
mental illness or disability is a contributing factor in the anti-social behaviour.
However, with the exception of JVM, it is also clear that the judges do not
think that evidence of mental disorder or incapacity bears on the nature of their
orders. They are inclined to accept, but not probe, the evidence of illness or
disability, and to grant the order anyway. In fact, the evidence of mental disorder
may almost explain, if not warrant, the order. A report on the law in Sweden
suggests the “draconian sanction [of eviction and sale] seems justified because
scenarios encountered in this Case [obnoxious behaviour] are usually caused
by some sort of mental disturbance on the part of the offender.”153 The courts
in Ontario and British Columbia have not said that mental disorder justifies
their rulings, but nor do they interrogate the fact that their orders, which are
reconstructing ownership within condominium, are in many cases a response to
behaviour that may well be attributable to mental disorder.
Are eviction and sale orders for anti-social behaviour an appropriate
reconstruction of ownership in light of the enormous increase in density of
owners that condominium facilitates? It may be that there are social circumstances
that justify enhancing collective forms of private governance and, in the case of
an owner’s anti-social behaviour, strengthening the capacity of a community of
title holders to sustain that community by expelling a chronically disruptive and
socially destructive owner.154 The South African High Court suggested as much
when, in declining to evict an owner for drug dealing and prostitution, it indicated
“there is a pressing ‘social need’ in South Africa” to provide title holders the
means to enforce the rules in sectional title properties, and that sometimes this
might include the capacity to exclude for “constant and deliberate contravention
of the conduct rules.”155 The analysis in the ruling is brief. The court appears to
take judicial notice of the “pressing ‘social need,’” and there is no explanation of
its nature or character. Cornelius Van Der Merwe and Juann Booysen suggest
several justifications, including one based on the observation that the impetus for
introducing sectional title (condominium) in South Africa “was the provision of
real property rights to a greater segment of the population, thereby fulfilling the
psychological need for a home.”156 They appear to suggest that in the social and
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political context of post-Apartheid South Africa, it may be particularly important
for owners within sectional title properties to feel safe and secure, and that the
capacity to exclude the chronically disruptive title holder might help. Perhaps,
but the history of South African property law in the twentieth century suggests
the need for great caution when constructing forms of property that enable
groups of owners to exclude, and Van Der Merwe and Booysen conclude that
a time-limited suspension of the right to use, rather than permanent expulsion,
is the appropriate and proportionate response to chronic misconduct.157
There is little doubt that the anti-social behaviour, which led to eviction
and sale orders in the cases surveyed here, substantially reduced the quality of
life for many if not all of the other owners within the condominium properties
involved. In some of the cases, the behaviour was so extreme as to threaten the
safety of the other residents. In every case where the order has been granted,
the behaviour was exceedingly disruptive and upsetting. My point in raising
the apparent prevalence of mental disorder in circumstances where courts are
making eviction and sale orders is neither to justify the anti-social behaviour
nor minimize its impact. Instead, my intent is to call attention to the fact that
these orders are reconstructing ownership within condominium and, by doing
so, redistributing property. This redistribution enhances the ownership for some
while diminishing the security of property for others, and those whose interests
are diminished appear, more often than not, to suffer a form of mental disorder
that contributes to their problematic behaviour. The eviction and sale orders,
which are not available to owners dealing with chronic anti-social behaviour
outside condominium, are providing owners within condominium the capacity to
expel other owners and, in doing so, are transforming long-held, well-established
understandings of ownership. To raise concern about this is not to conclude that
owners within condominium bear responsibility for those among them who are
mentally ill or have a mental disability. However, it is to ask whether, in adapting
the law of property to the spatial reorganization of ownership, the courts should
be reconstructing ownership within condominium in a manner that facilitates
the expulsion of the mentally ill.
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